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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE

EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE

EIGHTH

AMENDMENT PROHIBITS THE PENALTY OF DEATH FOR ONE WHO
NEITHER TOOK LIFE, ATTEMPTED OR INTENDED TO TAKE
LIFE, NOR CONTEMPLATED THAT LIFE WOULD
BE TAKEN

Enmund v. Florida (U.S. 1982)
On April 1, 1975, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong robbed and
fatally shot Thomas and Eunice Kersey while an accomplice, Earl
Enmund, waited in a nearby getaway car.' Subsequently, Enmund and
the Armstrongs were each indicted on counts of first-degree murder2
and robbery. 3 At Enmund's trial,4 the judge instructed the jury that
1. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3370 (1982). Upon arriving at
the Kersey farmhouse, Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back
door to speak with Thomas Kersey. Id. When Kersey came to the door,
Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a pistol at him, and instructed
Jeanette Armstrong to take Kersey's money. Id. Kersey screamed for help.
Id. Kersey's wife came out of the house with a gun and shot and wounded
eanette Armstrong. Id. Both of the Kerseys were then shot and killed by
ampson Armstrong and possibly, Jeanette Armstrong. Id. Based on the
medical examiner's testimony at trial, the trial court found that the Kerseys
were shot by two different caliber weapons and that they were shot while
lying in a prone position. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1372 (Fla.
1981). The only evidence of Enmund's participation was circumstantial, indicating that he was waiting in a car a few hundred feet from the Kersey home.
Id. at 1370. For further discussion of the evidence presented against Enmund
at his trial, see note 4 infra.
2. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. The felony murder statute in force at the time
of the killings provided as follows:
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a
premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any
uman being, or when committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery,
urglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy .. . shall be murder in the first
degree and shall constitute capital felony ....
FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1973).
3. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. The robbery statute in force at the time of the
killings was FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (1976). Section 812.13 provides that " 'Robbery'
means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of
larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault, or
putting in fear." Id.
4. Earl Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together before one
jury, but Jeanette Armstrong's trial was severed. 102 S. Ct. at 3370.

(173)
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under Florida's felony murder law, Enmund could be convicted of firstdegree felony murder if he was present as an accomplice in a robbery
in the commission of which a killing occurred. 6 Enmund was found
guilty on two counts of first-degree felony murder and one count of
robbery.e Acting upon the recommendation of the jury,7 the trial judge
sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of murder.8
The evidence of Enmund's involvement in the felony murders and the
underlying robbery was largely circumstantial. At the trial, two witnesses
testified that, at the approximate time of the killings, they saw a car similar
to Enmund's with a man sitting in it about 200 yards from the Kersey home.
Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1981). A neighbor of the
Kerseys, who lived about three-quarters of a mile away, testified that just
prior to the estimated time of the killings, he saw Enmund and Enmund's
former common-law wife, Ida Jean Shaw, drive by his house in their car with
two other people in the back seat. Id. The neighbor further testified that a
little over an hour later, he saw the same vehicle and four passengers drive
by again at a rather fast speed. Id. at 1365. A friend of Enmund's testified
that a few weeks before the killings, he and Enmund purchased a calf from
Mr. Kersey, and Mr. Kersey had remarked on the amount of cash he, Mr.
Kersey, kept on hand. Id. Ida Jean Shaw, Enmund's former common-law
wife, testified that Enmund told her that he had participated in the crime
in order to get the money that he knew Mr. Kersey possessed. Id. at 1366.
She further testified that, after the crime, she disposed of two pistols in accordance with Enmund's and Sampson Armstrong's directions. Id. Ida Jean
Shaw was granted immunity from prosecution for any role she played in the
crimes in return for her testimony. Id. at 1367. On appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court found that the evidence against Enmund was only sufficient
to support a finding that Enmund participated in the felony murders and
robbery as the getaway car driver. Id. at 1370.
5. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. The trial judge also instructed the jury that premeditated intent to kill was not required under Florida's felony murder law.
Id. He instructed the jury that:
[t]he killing of a human being while engaged in the perpetration of
or in the attempt to perpetrate the offense of robbery is murder in
the first degree even though there is no premeditated design or intent
to kill. . . . In order to obtain a conviction of first degree murder
while engaging in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the crime of robbery, the evidence must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was
actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and
that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the
attempted perpetration of the robbery.
Id.
6. Id. Sampson Armstrong was also found guilty on both counts of firstdegree felony murder and one count of robbery. Id. In her separate trial,
Jeanette Armstrong was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and
one count of robbery. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1371 (Fla. 1981).
7. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. Florida law requires a separate sentencing proceeding to be held in which the jurors hear evidence bearing on whether
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)
(Supp. 1981). The jury then weighs the existing mitigating circumstances
against the existing aggravating circumstances and renders an advisory sentence to the court, recommending life imprisonment or death. Id. § 921.141(2).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. Enmund also received a life sentence for the robbery conviction. Id. at 3381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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On a second appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida,9 after an
9. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 1981). On a previous
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the case was remanded for written
findings, which are required by Florida law when the death penalty is imposed.
102 S. Ct. at 3370. See FLA. STAT. §921.141(3) (Supp. 1981). The death
penalty statute requires the court to set forth written findings of fact showing
that sufficient enumerated aggravating circumstances exist and that they outweigh any existing mitigating circumstances. Id. §921.141(3).
The statute enumerates the following specific and exclusive aggravating
circumstances:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence
of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
'person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any
robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of
laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1981).
The statute goes on to provide for the following mitigating circumstances:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. § 921.141(6).
On remand, the trial judge found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and no statutory mitigating circumstances and sentenced
Enmund to death on both of the murder counts. Enmund v. State, 399 So.
2d 1362, 1371-72 (Fla. 1981). In his written findings, the trial judge listed
the following statutory aggravating circumstances: 1) the capital felony was
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interim remand for written findings, 10 Enmund claimed that his sentence
of death violated the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment because there was no evidence that he had intended to take
life. i" The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Enmund's convictions
and sentences.' 2 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
affirmance of Enmund's death sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, holding that the eighth
amendment prohibits the sentence of death for one who neither took
committed while Enmund was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of or an attempt to commit an armed robbery; 2) the capital felony was
committed for pecuniary gain; 3) the capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; and 4) Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (two separate offenses of
robbery with the use of violence). Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §921.141(5)(d), (f),
(h), (b)). Regarding the third aggravating circumstance listed, the trial judge
found that the murders were "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," because
Mr. and Mrs. Kersey were shot two and six times respectively while lying in a
prone position. 399 So. 2d at 1372. The trial judge also concluded in his
fndings that Enmund must have been a triggerman in the slayings, because
two different caliber weapons were used, and because Jeannette Armstrong
was seriously wounded at the time of the shootings. Id.
In declaring the "relatively minor" participation mitigating circumstance
inapplicable, the trial judge specifically found that Enmund's involvement in
the capital felony was major in that he "planned the capital felony and
actively participated in an attempt to avoid detection by disposing of the
murder weapons." Id. at 1373.
10. For a discussion of the written findings made on remand, see note 9
supra.
11. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d
claimed that Florida law improperly
sideration of mitigating circumstances
teenth amendments. Id.
He argued

1362, 1371 (Fla. 1981). Enmund also
restricted the jury's and judge's conin violation of the eighth and fourfurther that the trial judge had failed

to disclose the factual findings on which he had based his decision to impose
the death penalty, thereby precluding any challenge to those findings. Id.
Enmund also argued that I) there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction of robbery; 2) the testimony of Ida Jean Shaw, his common-law
wife, should have been excluded, because she was an incompetent witness,
and her testimony was likely the result of coercion; and 3) the first-degree
murder convictions were erroneous, since there was no evidence that he had
committed premeditated murder or that he was actually present and aiding or
abetting the robbery when the Kerseys were shot. Id. at 1367-68.
12. Id. at 1363. In affirming Enmund's death sentence, the Florida
Supreme Court consolidated two of the trial judge's findings of aggravating
circumstances into one aggravating circumstance and rejected another aggravating circumstance. See id. at 1373. The court stated that the trial court's
written findings that the capital felonies were committed during the perpetration of a robbery and for pecuniary gain "refer to the same aspect of the
defendant's crime" and treated the two circumstances as one. Id. (quoting
Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977)). Since the trial court did not find that Enmund personally killed the
Kerseys, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the trial judge's finding that the
capital felony was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel." See id. Enmund's sentence,
however, was still affirmed on the basis of two statutory aggravating circumstances and no statutory mitigating circumstances. Id.
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life, attempted to take life, intended to take life, nor contemplated that
life would be taken. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
. The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." 13 The balancing of
this amendment's prohibition against the traditional application of
capital punishment has given the Supreme Court much difficulty as
indicated by the large number of plurality decisions in death penalty
cases.1 4 Despite this difficulty, it is now settled that the death penalty
is not inherently unconstitutional.15 Nevertheless, the eighth amendment
may preclude imposition of the death penalty when the method of execution prescribed, the sentencing procedures employed, or the excessiveness of the penalty in relation to the nature of the crime committed
make that penalty one that is "cruel and unusual." 16
13. The eighth amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
For discussions of the history of the eighth amendment and the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969);
Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1979); Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle,
3 GRIM. L. BULL. 145 (1967); Comment, Evolutions of the Eighth Amendment
and Standards for the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 28 DE PAUL L. REV.
351 (1979). See also Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States
Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975); Note, Capital
Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 261 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Bell v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) ("We hold that the
death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the

offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to

impose it."). For a discussion of Gregg, see notes 28-32 & 46-52 and accompanying text infra.
For discussions of capital punishment, see H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA (1982); H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1977); F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL (1978); M.
MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL;

THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(1973); Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of
the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 1177 (1981). For discussions of felony murder, see Burns & Reid, From Felony Murder to Accomplice Felony Attempted Murder: the Rake's Progress Compleat?, 55 CAN. B.
REV. 75 (1977); Comment, Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine,
23 CATH. LAW. 133 (1978); Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the
Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356 (1978).
16. For a discussion of the eighth amendment limits on methods of execution, see notes 17-20 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of

how the eighth amendment limits capital sentencing procedures, see notes
21-32 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the eighth amendment
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The earliest capital punishment cases heard by the Supreme Court
concerned the constitutionality of particular methods of execution rather
than the constitutionality of the death penalty itself.17 Early challenges
were made to both the sentence of death by electrocution Is and the
sentence of death by public shooting.19 Although the Supreme Court
upheld these methods of execution, the Court stated unequivocally that
punishments torturous or barbarous in nature were prohibited by the
20
eighth amendment.
More recently, the Supreme Court has construed the eighth amendment as prohibiting the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty under
22
inadequate sentencing procedures. 2' In Furman v. Georgia,
the imposition of the death penalty was held unconstitutional because the
prohibition of a death sentence that is excessive in relation to a particular

crime, see notes 46-60 and accompanying text infra.

17. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 18 & 19 infra.
18. See In re Kemmier, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (challenge to a sentence of
death by electrocution). See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947) (challenge to a second electrocution after an .earlier
electrocution failed to cause death). In both Kemmler and Francis, the
Supreme Court examined the method of execution under the eighth amendment's prohibition, even though it did not hold that the eighth amendment
was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 136 U.S.
446-47; 329 U.S. 462-64.
19. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). Wilkerson's sentence of
death by public shooting was imposed by the Territory of Utah and was
therefore subject to the eighth amendment. Id. at 133. Although Wilkerson
challenged his sentence as being a violation of a federal statute, rather than
a violation of the eighth amendment, the Supreme Court specifically found
that his sentence was not a violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 136.
20. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)
("The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence."); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death .... ."); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136
(1879) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others
in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the eighth] amendment ....
").
It should also be noted that in addition to restricting methods of punishment, the eighth amendment also limits that which may be made punishable.
See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1972). In Robinson, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California statute making it a criminal
offense to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." Id. at 667. In so holding, the
Court in Robinson focused on the unconstitutionality of making a particular
physical status a crime. Id. at 666-68. After comparing drug addiction to
other serious illnesses, such as leprosy and mental illness, the Court stated
that making any disease a criminal offense would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment. Id. at 666.
21. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a discussion of
Furman, see notes 22-29 and accompanying text infra.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Consolidated with Furman v. Georgia were
Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. Id. at 240. Furman was convicted
of murder, while Jackson and Branch were both convicted of rape. Id. at 239.
Each petitioner was tried by a jury. Id. at 240.
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capital sentencing procedures employed left the determination of
whether the death penalty should be imposed entirely to the discretion
of the judge or jury. 23 The death sentences in Furman and two companion cases were struck down in a five-to-four decision in which each
justice wrote a separate opinion.24 Three justices found the death
penalty to be "cruel and unusual" because of its arbitrary and standardless application.2 5 Two justices found the death penalty unconstitutional per se, 26 while the four dissenting justices found the death penalty
constitutional.2 7 The Supreme Court later clarified its Furman holding
in Gregg v. Georgia.2s The Gregg Court's formulation of the Furman
23. Id. at 240. The relevant statutes in force at the time were the following: GA. CODE ANN. §26-1005 (Supp. 1971) [Furman]; GA. CODE ANN.
§26-1302 (Supp. 1971) [Jackson]; TEx. PENAL CODE art. 1189 (Vernon 1961)
[Branch]. 480 U.S. at 239.
24. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
25. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
In reaching his decision, Justice Douglas observed that all three petitioners before the Court were black. Id. at 252-53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
He further noted the existence of evidence that the death penalty was imposed
upon blacks more often than upon whites. Id. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas declared that the eighth amendment requires "legislatures
to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary," and
also requires "judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely,
selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups."
Id. at 256 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
Justice Stewart stated: "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309
(Stewart, J., concurring). After observing the small minority of eligible defendants upon whom the death penalty was actually imposed, Justice Stewart
stated that the eighth and fourteenth amendments "cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
Justice White found the death penalty in Furman violative of the eighth
amendment because it only marginally contributed to "any discernible social
or public purposes." Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring). He found neither
the purpose of deterrence nor the purpose of retribution sufficiently served
because of the infrequent imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 311-13
(White, J., concurring). Justice White attributed the infrequent use of the
death penalty to the "recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to
the jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion . . . , may refuse to
impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime."
Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
Even though Justice Douglas, Justice Stewart, and Justice White all
addressed the problem of arbitrariness in their concurring opinions, the Supreme Court subsequently stated that the holding of Furman may be viewed
as the position taken by Justices Stewart and White since they concurred
on the narrowest grounds. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
26. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
28. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The petitioner in Gregg was convicted by a
Georgia trial court on two counts of murder and two counts of armed rob-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 28: p. 173

holding was that the death penalty "could not be imposed under
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 29 Six of the seven
concurring justices in Gregg found that Georgia's revised post-Furman
capital sentencing procedures, which provided, inter alia, for bifurcated
trials and the admission of evidence of specific statutory aggravating
and mitigating circumstances,8 0 prevented the death penalty from being
imposed in the arbitrary manner the Court had earlier condemned.31
In upholding the revised sentencing procedures, the plurality in Gregg
stated that the procedures properly focused the sentencing body's attention on the "particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant" while checking the exercise
82
of discretion.
bery. Id. at 160. Evidence at trial indicated that Gregg and a traveling
companion picked up two hitchhikers while traveling through Florida. Id.
at 158. Later, when the vehicle was stopped, Gregg shot and killed both
hitchhikers and robbed them of their valuables. Id. at 159. Gregg claimed
self-defense at trial, declaring that the two hitchhikers had attacked him and
his companion. ld. at 160. The jury found him guilty on all four counts
and sentenced him to death. Id. at 161-62. For a discussion of Gregg with
respect to the issue of excessiveness, see notes 46-52 and accompanying text
infra.
29. 428 U.S. at 188.
30. Id. at 163-66. The revised sentencing procedures bifurcated capital
trials into a guilt stage and a sentencing stage, and, during the sentencing
stage, the sentencing body, whether judge or jury, was directed to hear aggravating and mitigating evidence. Id. at 163. Prior to imposing the death
penalty, the sentencing body was required to find at least one of ten statutory
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 164-66. The
revised procedures further provided for automatic appeal to the state supreme
court which was directed to scrutinize the death sentence for any indication
of arbitrary imposition. Id. at 166. On such review, the state supreme court
was required not only to look for the presence of any arbitrary factors in
imposing the penalty, but also to determine whether the evidence supported
the enumerated aggravating circumstance(s) and whether the death penalty
was excessive or disproportionate in light of the punishments imposed in
similar cases. Id. at 166-67.
31. Id. at 158; id. at 207 (White, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
unconstitutionality of the capital sentencing procedures employed in Furman,
see notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
32. 428 U.S. at 206. The Court decided four other death penalty cases
on the same day that it decided Gregg. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). In Pro/fitt and
Jurek, the Court upheld the penalties of death after finding that the sentencing
schemes were free of the problems of arbitrariness encountered in Furman.
See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 259-60; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276-77.
The Court further observed that the sentencing schemes properly focused the
sentencing body's attention on the circumstances of the individual defendant.
428 U.S. at 258; 428 U.S. at 276. It should be noted that both Proffitt and
Jurek had been found guilty of premeditated murder. 428 U.S. at 246; 428
U.S. at 267-68.
In Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court struck
down the death penalties of two murderers and held that mandatory death
statutes violate the eighth amendment. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at
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just as the death penalty may not be imposed in a barbarous or
arbitrary manner, neither may it be imposed when it is excessive in
relation to the crime committed.83 The concept that excessive punishments are prohibited by the eighth amendment was first developed and
applied by the Supreme Court in cases not involving capital punishment.8 4 It evolved from a dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont,3
in which the defendant had been sentenced to more than 54 years of
imprisonment for 307 counts of selling intoxicating liquor.36 The
majority dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds,8 7 but, in a
vigorous dissent, Justice Field asserted that O'Neil's sentence violated
the eighth amendment because of its excessive nature.38 Justice Field
maintained that the eighth amendment prohibited not only those
punishments that were considered torturous but also those that were
severely disproportionate to the crime.8 9
304-05; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336. The Court stated that the
Constitution requires individualized consideration of the circumstances of the
offense and the character of the defendant before the death penalty may be
imposed. 428 U.S. at 303-04; 428 U.S. at 333. In more recent cases, the
Court has invalidated death sentences because not all mitigating circumstances
were considered by the sentencing authority. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102
S. Ct. 869 (1982) (trial judge failed to consider mitigating circumstance);
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (hearsay rule precluded admission of
mitigating evidence); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (statute precluded
consideration of all mitigating circumstances); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (statute precluded full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances); Roberts v. Louisiana, 421 U.S. 633 (1977) (statute prevented consideration of particularized mitigating factors).
33. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). For a discussion of
Coker, see notes 53-60 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the
excessiveness concept in general, see notes 33-60 and accompanying text infra.
34. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910); O'Neil

v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 338-41 (1892).

For a discussion of Weems, see

notes 40-45 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of O'Neil, see

notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
35. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
36. Id. at 330. O'Neil was convicted of selling liquor in violation of
Vermont law. Id. at 331. The pertinent statute provided that each sale could
be punished as a separate offense. Id. at 326. The actual judgment of the
trial court was that O'Neil should pay a fine, prosecution costs, and commitment costs, a total of $6638.72, before a certain date or be confined to hard
labor for 19,914 days. Id. at 330. The term of confinement was computed
on the ratio of three days for every dollar in default of payment. Id. at 331.
37. Id. at 337. The appeal was dismissed because the record did not
present a federal question. Id. at 334-35. The Court stated that the eighth
amendment was not applicable to the states. Id. at 332 (citing Pervear v.
Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866)). The Court directly applied the eighth
amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment for the first
time in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Turkington, supra
note 13, at 152. For a discussion of Robinson, see note 20 supra.
38. See 144 U.S. at 338-41 (Field, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field wrote,
[The phrase cruel and unusual] is usually applied to punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot,
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The Supreme Court first accepted and applied Justice Field's O'Neil
reasoning in Weems v. United States.40

Weems was convicted by a

Philippine court for falsifying an official document.4 1 Following his
conviction, Weems was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor in chains,
fined a substantial amount, stripped of marital, parental, property and
political rights, and subjected to permanent surveillance by the authorities. 42 Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice McKenna
declared that "[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those who . . .
believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to offense." 43 After comparing the
punishment imposed on Weems to the punishment authorized for other
offenses, 44 the Court concluded that Weems' punishment was cruel and
45
unusual.
the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute

pain and suffering. . . . The inhibition is directed, not only against
punishments of the character mentioned, but against all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged.
Id.

40. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The decision in Weems has since been cited
for the proposition that the concept of excessivness is embraced by the eighth
amendment. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3372 (1982); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 153, 171
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
41. 217 U.S. at 357-58. Weems was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of
Coast Guard and Transportation. Id. at 357. The falsification consisted of
two entries in a cash book that the sums of 208 and 408 pesos, Philippine
currency, had been paid out as wages to lighthouse employees. Id. at 35758. An intentional false entry in a public and official document was all that
was necessary to constitute the offense. Id. at 363. No intent to defraud
the government was necessary. Id.
42. Id. at 358, 364-65. Weems' sentence was imposed by the Philippine
court in accordance with the penal laws of Spain. See id. at 363.
43. Id. at 366-67.
44. Id. at 380-81. The Court found that some degrees of homicide, misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the government by

force, forgery, robbery, larceny, and other serious crimes were not punished as

severely as Weems' offense. Id. at 380. The Court also found that a United
States statute for the crime of embezzlement carried only a maximum fine of
twice the amount embezzled and a maximum prison term of two years. Id.
45. Id. at 377-82. In describing Weems' punishment, the Court stated
"[i]t is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and
follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come
under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree
and kind." Id. at 377. It should be noted that the ban on cruel and unusual

punishment applied in Weems was found in the Philippine Bill of Rights,
which contained the same language as the eighth amendment and was considered to have the same meaning. Id. at 367.
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has invalidated a sentence
of punishment because of its unusual rather than excessive nature. See Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop, a former soldier had been stripped of
his citizenship because of a conviction for wartime desertion. Id. at 87. The
plurality found that the penalty of denationalization violated the eighth
amendment. id. at 99-104. Noting that wartime desertion was also punish-
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The concept of excessiveness has been employed by the Supreme

46
Court in a decision upholding the death penalty.

In Gregg v. Georgia,47

the Court upheld the death sentence imposed on a defendant convicted
of intentional murder. 48 In reaching its decision, a plurality of the
Court described the eighth amendment concept of excessiveness as prohibiting two types of punishment: 1) punishments involving the unnecessary infliction of pain and 2) punishments disproportionate to the
offense. 49 In evaluating the proportionality of the penalty to the offense,
the Gregg Court emphasized that the eighth amendment was not a
static concept but rather must be interpreted in light of "evolving
standards of decency," and, therefore, turned to an analysis of factors
that were objective manifestations of society's endorsement of the death
penalty for the crime of deliberate murder-the history of capital
punishment, legislative judgments, and the sentencing behavior of
juries. 50 Turning to the alternate aspect of the excessiveness concept,
able by death, the plurality rejected the argument that denationalization was
disproportionate to the offense. Id. at 99. Rather, the Court based its holding on the unusual nature of the punishment. Id. at 99-104. In reaching its
decision, the plurality in Trop examined the practices of other civilized nations
and found that denationalization as a penalty for desertion was extremely rare.
Id. at 102-03. In describing the eighth amendment, the plurality stated, "[I]t
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. This language has been subsequently quoted by the Supreme Court with approval. See, e.g., Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173; Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a discussion of Gregg,
see notes 47-52 and accompanying text infra.
47. 428 U.S. at 153. For the facts of Gregg, see note 28 supra. For a discussion of the Court's approval of the revised sentencing procedures in Gregg,
see notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
48. 428 U.S. at 160, 187. Gregg's jury was instructed on both intentional
murder and felony murder theories but based its verdict on intentional murder
findings. Id. at 160. Intentional murder required "malice aforethought."
Id. at 162 n.4.
49. 428 U.S. at 173. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, declared
that

[w]hen a form of punishment in the abstract (in this case, whether
capital punishment may ever be imposed as a sanction for murder)
rather than in the particular (the propriety of death as a penalty to
be applied to a specific defendant for a specific crime) is under consideration, the inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects. First,
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 176-87. The "evolving standards of decency" concept originated
in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Chief Justice Warren stated "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at 101. For a discussion of Trop, see note 45 supra. The plurality in
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the Court held that the penalty of death for deliberate murder did not
involve the unnecessary infliction of pain because it served two social
purposes of punishment-retribution and deterrence.51 After conducting its excessiveness analysis, the plurality in Gregg concluded that the
penalty of death was neither too severe nor disproportionate for the
crime of intentional murder.52
Most recently, in Coker v. Georgia,53 a plurality decision rendered
one year after Gregg, the Court held that the penalty of death was unGregg found that history in both England and the United States strongly supported the use of capital punishment. 428 U.S. at 176-79. The plurality
similarly found that the legislative response to Furman indicated acceptance of
the death penalty, since at least 35 states had enacted new death penalty
statutes. Id. at 179-80. The Gregg court also found that the behavior of
juries indicated the "utility and necessity" of the death penalty in some cases,
since more than 460 persons had been sentenced to death between June of
1972, when Furman was decided, and March of 1976. Id. at 182.
51. Id. at 186-87. The Gregg plurality stated that capital punishment is
partially "an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct," and that retribution is essential in an ordered society in which
citizens must rely on legal processes to vindicate their wrongs. Id. at 183. The
plurality observed that results of statistical attempts to evaluate the deterrent
effect of the death penalty were inconclusive. Id. at 184-85. In light of its
evaluation of retribution and deterrence, the Gregg plurality stated:
[W]e cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia legislature that
capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular state the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction,
require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence,
that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without
justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
Id. at 186-87.
52. Id. at 187. In making these findings, the Gregg plurality stated:
[W]e are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is
invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction,
suitable to the most extreme of crimes.
Id. In a footnote, the Court reserved judgment on whether death is a proportionate penalty when the offense does not involve loss of life. Id. at n.35.
53. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coker was charged and convicted of escape from
prison, armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape. Id. at 587.
He was sentenced to death for the rape conviction after the jury found the
presence of two aggravating circumstances. Id. at 591. The first aggravating
circumstance was that enumerated in GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(1) (1977): "The
offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony .... .. " Id.
Coker had been previously convicted for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. 433 U.S. at 587. The second aggravating circumstance found
by the jury was provided in GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(2) (1977): "The offense of
murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of another capital felony .... ." Id. Coker
was brandishing a knife and in the process of robbing the rape victim and
her husband when he committed the rape. 433 U.S. at 587.
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54
Relying on
constitutionally disproportionate to the offense of rape.
Court in
the
by
only the second aspect of excessiveness articulated
55
enunciated
factors
Gregg, the Coker Court first examined the objective
in Gregg-history, legislative attitudes, and jury behavior-to determine
50
Based
the proportionality of the death penalty to the crime of rape.
on this examination, the Coker Court found that the objective factors
57
Without
favored rejection of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
discounting the significance of these findings, the Court stated that it
had the ultimate duty to decide constitutional questions, and, therefore,
5s
In conducting this
turned to a subjective analysis of proportionality.
analysis, the plurality in Coker determined that the penalty of death
"is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human

54. 433 U.S. at 592. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court
in which Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 586. Justices
Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment in separate opinions stating
that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. Id. at 600 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Powell concurred in the
judgment on the facts of the case but maintained that the death sentence for
rape would not be unconstitutional in all cases. See id. at 601 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Court was preventing effective punishment for serious offenders. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The holding of Coker is actually limited to the crime of rape of an adult
woman. See id. at 597.
55. The Coker plurality expressly recognized the two aspects of eighth
amendment excessiveness announced in Gregg. Writing for the plurality,
Justice White stated:
Under Gregg, a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the test on
either ground.
433 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). The Coker plurality did not evaluate the
petitioner's death sentence under the first aspect of excessiveness, and only
noted that "it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment ...."
Id. at n.4. The Court found such an evaluation unnecessary because of its
finding of unconstitutionality under the second aspect of excessiveness. Id.
56. Id. at 593-97. In examining the objective criteria, the plurality made
the following findings: only 20 state and federal jurisdictions authorized the
death penalty for rape in 1925, and that number had fallen to 16 states and
the federal government by 1971. Id. at 593. Although two states, Florida
and Mississippi, authorized the death penalty for the rape of a child in 1977,
Georgia was the only jurisdiction currently authorizing the death penalty for
the rape of an adult woman. Id. at 595-96. Georgia juries had not imposed
the death penalty for the crime of rape in at least nine out of ten cases since
1973. Id. at 596-97.
57. Id. at 596-97.
58. Id. at 597. The plurality stated: "These recent events evidencing
the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine
this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28:

p. 173

life." 59 Based on its examination of objective factors as well as its own
subjective analysis, the Court concluded that the imposition of the
death penalty for the offense of rape was a penalty disproportionate to
the crime and as such violated the eighth amendment.60
Against this background, the Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida
began its analysis of the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty
on a felony murderer who did not kill, attempt or intend to kill, or
anticipate that a life would be taken.6 1 Relying closely on the plurality's
analysis in Coker v. Georgia, a plurality of four justices began its determination of whether the death sentence was excessive in relation to
Enmund's offense by looking first at the objective factors associated
62
with a disproportionality analysis.
The first objective factor addressed by the Enmund Court was
legislative judgment. 63 The plurality concluded that the predominant
legislative view favored rejection of capital punishment for an offender
such as Enmund. 64 The Court found that out of thirty-six state and
federal jurisdictions currently authorizing the death penalty, only nine
allowed a sentence of death for a defendant who merely participated in
59. Id. at 598. Weighing the gravity of the offense of rape, the plurality
stated that "[r]ape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,
it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life." Id. The plurality further noted the disparity under Georgia
law of allowing some rapists to be sentenced to death while sparing the lives
of some murderers. Id. at 600. This would be the situation where aggravating circumstances exist in the case of a rapist, and no aggravating circumstances exist in the case of a murderer. See id.
60. Id. at 597.
61. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in Enmund and
was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 102 S. Ct. at 3369.
Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 3379 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 3372. Justice White wrote for the plurality: "[T]he Court
[in Coker v. Georgia] looked to the historical development of the punishment
at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made before bringing its own judgment to bear on the
matter. We proceed to analyze the punishment at issue in this case in a
similar manner." Id. For a discussion of Coker v. Georgia, see notes 53-60
and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that the Enmund plurality
never specifically addressed the historical development of the death penalty.
63. 102 S. Ct. at 3372-74.
64. Id. at 3374. After analyzing current legislation, the Court stated:
While the current legislative judgment with respect to imposition of
the death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take
it, or intend to take life is neither "wholly unanimous among state
legislatures" . . . nor as compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital
punishment for the crime at issue.
Id. at 3374 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 596).
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a robbery in which a killing occurred, 65 while nine others would allow
a death sentence in such circumstances only in the presence of other
aggravating evidence. 66
A second objective factor considered by the Enmund Court was
societal attitude, as reflected by statistical data on the sentencing decisions of juries. 67 The Enmund Court found that out of 362 inmates
executed for homicide since 1954, only six were "nontriggerman" felony
murderers. 68 Further evidence of jury nullification in this instance was
65. 102 S. Ct. at 3372. Specifically, the following statutory provisions of
nine jurisdictions were cited as authorizing the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life: CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(l)(a), 775.082(1),
921.141(5)(d) (1976 8c Supp. 1982); GA. CODE §§ 26-1101(b), (c), 27-2534.1(b)
(2) (Supp. 1980); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19(2) (e), 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp.
1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(l)(b), 200.030(4), 200.033 (4) (1981); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(c) (a)(1) (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 392402(a), 39-2404 (i)(7) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030 (1)(e)(l),

9A.32.040(l) (1977 & Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-101, 6-4-102(h) (iv) (Supp.
1981). See 102 S. Ct. at 3372 n.5.
66. 102 S. Ct. at 3374. Six states authorized the death penalty for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life but made minor
participation a statutory mitigating circumstance. Id. (citing ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703G(3) (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 56a-46a(f)(4) (Supp. 1981);
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §46-18-304(6) (1979);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15(A)-2000(f)(4)
(Supp. 1981)). Three states authorized the death penalty for participation
in a robbery in which another takes life but excluded felony murder as an
aggravating circumstance. 102 S. Ct. at 3374 (citing IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(f)
(1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §701.12 (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1981)). All of the nine states above required aggravating
circumstances above and beyond the felony murder itself. 102 S. Ct. at 3374.
The plurality found that the remaining 18 jurisdictions authorizing the death

penalty would not permit Enmund to be sentenced to death either because
1) felony murder was not a capital crime; 2) some culpable mental state
was required; 3) the defendant must actually have committed murder; or 4)
the defendant's participation in murder must have been more than "relatively
minor." Id. at 3373. The plurality noted that the dissent had categorized
current legislation differently. Id. at 3374 n.15. For a discussion of the
dissent's analysis of legislation, see notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
The plurality also addressed international opinion, noting that "the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely
restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and
is unknown in continental Europe." Id. at 3376 n.22.
67. Id. at 3375. The plurality stated, "Society's rejection of the death
penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders is also indicated by the
sentencing decisions that juries have made.

.

.

. '[T]he jury .

.

. is a significant

and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly
involved.'" Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 596). The plurality
termed the jury decision evidence "overwhelming." Id.
68. Id. Specifically, 339 of the prisoners executed personally committed
the homicidal assault. Id. Two prisoners had another person commit the
homicide for them. Id. In 16 cases, the facts reported did not reveal whether
the person executed actually committed the homicide. Id. All six nontriggerman felony murderers who were executed were executed in 1955. Id.

In contrast, the Court noted that between 1955 and the Coker decision there
had been 72 executions for rape. Id..
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found by the plurality in the current national death row population.
Out of 739. condemned murderers in the United States, only three
prisoners who were not physically present during the murder, including
Enmund, were sentenced to death absent findings that they solicited
someone else to kill or participated in a scheme designed to kill a
victim. 69 In a similar but more narrow examination, the Enmund
Court found that Enmund was the only one of forty-five felony murderers on Florida's death row who was neither a triggerman or an
70
intentional participant in murder.
In reaching its conclusion that the death penalty was excessive in
relation to Enmund's crime, 71 the Court did not rely solely on these
objective factors. Like the plurality in Coker, the Enmund Court stated
that it was ultimately the duty of the Court to determine whether
Enmund's punishment was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.72 After finding the death penalty to be excessive for the offense
of robbery, 73 the plurality turned to an analysis of Enmund's individual
culpability in the murders.7 4 Noting the absence of evidence that
69. See id. at 3375-76. On October 1, 1982, there were actually 796
inmates sentenced to death for homicide in the United States. Id. at 3375.
Sufficient data was only available for 739 of the inmates, but this data revealed that only 41 did not participate in the actual homicidal assault. Id.
Of these 41 inmates, there was only sufficient information on 40, but this
information revealed that only 16 of them were not physically present during
the murder. Id. Only 3 of these 16 inmates were sentenced to death in the
absence of findings that they either hired someone to kill or participated in a
scheme to kill. Id. at 3375-76.
70. Id. at 3376. Of the 45 felony murderers on Florida's death row,
36 intended that life be taken, and 8 others committed the homicidal assault.
Id.
The plurality recognized and addressed the dissent's criticism of the jury
decision statistics. Id. at 3376. For a discussion of the dissent's criticism
and the plurality's response, see notes 88-90 and accompanying text infra.
71. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
72. Id. at 3376. Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated, "Although the judgments of legislatures, juries and prosecutors weigh heavily
in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund ....
Id.
73. Id. at 1377. Before examining the proportionality of the death
penalty for Enmund's participation in the felony murder, the plurality analyzed
the proportionality of the death penalty for his participation in the underlying felony, robbery. Id. Relying on Coker v. Georgia, the plurality found
that robbery "does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life." Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 443 U.S. at 598).
Consequently, the plurality found the death penalty excessive for the "robber
who, as such, does not take human life." Id. For this portion of the Coker
plurality's analysis, see note 59 and accompanying text supra.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 3377. The plurality stated that
[t]he focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on "individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the
death sentence," . . . which means that we must focus on "relevant

facets of the character and record of the individual offender."
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Enmund killed, attempted to kill, or had any intention of participating
in a murder, the plurality found Enmund's individual culpability
"plainly different from that of the robbers who killed ...the Kerseys." 75
Attribution to Enmund of the killers' culpability was found by the
76
Court to be impermissible under the eighth amendment.
In addition to finding Enmund's death sentence excessive because
it was disproportionate to his offense, the Enmund plurality also found
his death sentence unconstitutional on an alternate basis-the "purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering." 77 The Court found
that neither the purpose of deterrence nor the purpose of retribution
was served by Enmund's death sentence.78 The Court reasoned that the
death penalty was an ineffective deterrent for offenders such as Enmund,
who neither intend nor contemplate a killing, since the threat of
the death penalty for vicarious felony murder does not "enter into the
cold calculus that precedes the decision to act." 79 The plurality further
noted that very few robberies result in felony murders, and that even
when they do, the penalty of death is rarely imposed on a vicarious
felony murderer. s 0 As to the purpose of retribution, the Enmund
Id. at 3377 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). For a discussion of Lockett and
Woodson, see note 32 supra.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
76. See id. Writing for the plurality, Justice White declared that
[i]t is fundamental that "causing harm intentionally must be punished
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally." . . .
Enmund did not kill and thus his culpability is plainly different
from that of the robbers who killed; yet the state treated them alike
and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the
Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 3377 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
77. Id. at 3377-79. Relying on both Gregg and Coker, the plurality
stated that
"[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes:
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."
. . . Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund's
position measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it
"is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering," and hence an unconstitutional punishment.
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at
592)). For a discussion of Gregg, see notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Coker, see notes 53-60 and accompanying text supra.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 3377-78.
79. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186). The Court stated,
"it seems likely that 'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.' " Id. (quoting Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
80. Id. at 3378. The plurality found that robbery statistics indicated that
only approximately 0.5% of robberies result in homicide. Id. & nn.23, 24
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment at 38, n.96 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments, 1980); United States Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 17 (1981)). The plurality did imply,
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plurality found that, since Enmund did not participate intentionally or
physically in the murders, the penalty of death would not "measurably
contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his
just deserts." 81

Justice Brennan concurred separately in the judgment, abiding by
his position in Gregg, in which he asserted that the penalty of death, in
all circumstances, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment. 82
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined.8 z The dissent first
conducted an extensive review of the facts of the case and the findings
of the trial court. 84 As did the Enmund plurality, the dissent next
analyzed the objective factors of Gregg-historical precedent, legislative
judgments, and jury sentencing decisions-in order to determine the
proportionality of the death penalty to Enmund's offense. 85 Based on
this examination, the dissent concluded that "the available data [did]
however, that if the likelihood of a killing in connection with a robbery were
more substantial, they could find an accomplice blameworthy. Id. at 3378.
In asserting that the death penalty is rarely imposed on a vicarious felony
murderer, the plurality apparently relied on its earlier analysis of current
legislation and jury sentencing behavior. See 102 S. Ct. at 3378. For a
discussion of the Enmund plurality's analysis of these two factors, see notes
63-70 and accompanying text supra.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 3378. The plurality stated that "[a]s for retribution as
a justification for executing Enmund, we think this very much depends on
the degree of Enmund's culpability-what Enmund's intentions, expectations,
and actions were." Id. Continuing, the plurality stated, "For purposes of
imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability must be limited
to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his
personal responsibility and moral guilt." Id.
82. Id. at 3379 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It should be noted that in the past Justice
Marshall frequently joined Justice Brennan in asserting the unconstitutionality
of the death penalty in all circumstances. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 474 (1981); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980); Bell v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 637, 643 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 619 (1978); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314
(1972). In Enmund, however, Justice Marshall joined the plurality opinion.
It should further be noted that Enmund is not the first case in which Justice
Marshall has refrained from asserting an absolutist position. See Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982). For a very brief discussion of Eddings, see
note 32 supra.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 3379-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 3387-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Relying on the plurality
in Coker, the dissent stated that it must first evaluate historical precedent and
contemporary standards as expressed by legislatures and juries before considering qualitative factors bearing on the proportionality of Enmund's offense
and punishment. Id. at 3386-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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not show that society has rejected conclusively the death penalty for
felony murderers." 86
After a brief examination of the historical development of the
felony murder doctrine,8 7 the dissent turned to an attack on the plurality's use of jury sentencing statistics.88 Justice O'Connor asserted that
the statistics relied on by the plurality were misleading as they failed to
reveal the percentage of homicides charged as felony murders and the
percentage of vicarious felony murder cases where the death penalty was
sought.8 9 The dissent also argued that the statistics used by the plurality
might only reveal a degree of caution on the part of sentencing judges
and juries in imposing the death penalty. 90
The last objective factor addressed by the dissent was legislative
judgment. 91 In conducting its examination of current legislation, the
dissent rejected the plurality's "curious method of counting the states." 92
86. Id. at 3387 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Id. The dissent observed that the felony murder rule and its corresponding capital penalty originated under early English common law and
that both were recognized in England until 1957 when Parliament classified
an unintentional killing during a felony as manslaughter. Id. The dissent
further observed that the felony murder doctrine received recognition in the
American colonies and "continued largely unabated into the Twentieth
Century." Id. Although the dissent recognized the existence of evidence that
judges and juries, over the years, often acquitted alleged felony murderers or
found them guilty of lesser offenses, the dissent reasoned that it was only
speculative that such nullification was the result of dissatisfaction with the
capital felony murder doctrine. Id. The dissent reasoned that much of the
nullification was the result of dissatisfaction with the mandatory death penalty
and the failure of early statutes and common law to classify murder by
degree. Id.
88. Id. at 3387-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
plurality's examination of jury sentencing statistics, see notes 67-70 and
accompanying text supra.
89. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that with-'
out the pertinent percentages, "we cannot know the fraction of cases in which
juries rejected the death penalty for accomplice felony murder." Id. The
Enmund plurality, noting this criticism, declared that it was probably not
possible to gather the desired information. Id. at 3376. The plurality further
stated that even if the information was available and indicated that the death
penalty was rarely sought for accomplice felony murder, it would tend to
show that prosecutors consider the death penalty disproportionate to the
offense. Id.
The dissent further questioned the relevance of the plurality's jury sentencing statistics in that many of the statistics classified defendants on the basis
of physical participation in a murder rather than the possession of an intent
to kill. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In responding to this criticism,
th Enmund plurality asserted that the statistics were still relevant, since
Enmund's claim was that the death penalty was excessive not only because he
did not intend or attempt to kill but also because he did not kill. Id. at 3376.
90. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 3388-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the plurality's examination of legislative judgment, see notes 63-66 and accompanying
text supra.
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Focusing its examination solely on whether a death sentence was possible
for a felony murderer who neither killed nor intended to kill,1a the dis-

sent found twenty-four states that allowed the death penalty in such
circumstances, thus concluding that the death penalty for Enmund's
offense did not "fall short of our national 'standards of decency.' " 94
After determining that the objective factors failed to establish that
the death penalty was disproportionate to Enmund's offense, the dissent
engaged in a subjective comparison of Enmund's punishment to his
offense. 95 The Enmund dissent found that even though Enmund only
intentionally participated in a robbery, his participation was partially
responsible for the two deaths that resulted.9 6 Based on this level of
intentional participation, the dissent reasoned that the imposition of
93. 102 S. Ct. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor characterized the issue before the Court as "whether a scheme that permits imposition of the death penalty, absent a finding that the defendant either killed or
intended to kill the victims, is unconstitutional." Id. The dissent did not
discuss the fact that Enmund was sentenced to death absent even a finding
that he contemplated a killing. See id. at 3372, 3379 (White, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The 24 states found by the
dissent consisted of the 18 states recognized by the plurality as well as
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Vermont. Id.
For the list of the 18 jurisdictions recognized by the plurality, see notes 65-66
supra. The plurality dismissed the six additional states found by the dissent,
declaring that their statutes would not allow the death penalty in Enmund's
case. 102 S. Ct. at 3374 n.15. Three of the six states required some form of
mental state. Id. at 3373 n.8. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1501(1)(a) (Supp.
1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§636(a)(2), (6) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 507.020 (b) (Supp. 1980). Colorado made minimal participation in a murder
an absolute bar to the death penalty. 102 S. Ct. at 3374 n.15. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978).
New Mexico precluded the death penalty unless
there was a specific intent to kill or a peace officer was the murder victim. 102
S. Ct. at 3375 n.15. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-4(C)(1), (2), 31-20A-5(A)-(G)
(Supp. 1981). Vermont limited the death penalty to murderers who killed a
second time or killed a correctional officer. 102 S. Ct. at 3375 n.ll & 15. See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(b), (c) (Supp. 1981).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 3390-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated,
"[T]he Eighth Amendment concept of proportionality involves more than
merely a measurement of contemporary standards of decency. It requires in
addition that the penalty imposed in a capital case be proportional to the

harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness."
96. Id. at 3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id.

The dissent stated: "There

is no dispute that [the Kersey's] lives were unjustifiably taken, and that the
petitioner, as one who aided and abetted the armed robbery, is legally liable
for their deaths." Id. The dissent further noted that Enmund planned the
robbery and that therefore his role was not minor. Id. at 3391 n.40 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).

Justice O'Connor reasoned that in affirming the finding of no

statutory mitigating circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court had affirmed
the finding that Enmund had planned the robbery. Id. She pointed out
that, at the sentencing hearing, Enmund's counsel conceded that Enmund
initiated the robbery. Id. For a discussion of the trial court's findings, see
note 9 supra. For a discussion of the Florida Supreme Court's review of the
findings, see note 12 supra.
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the death penalty was not disproportionate. 97 Accusing the plurality
of discounting lesser degrees of mental state, 98 Justice O'Connor concluded that the plurality had made intent to kill a matter of constitutional law and had opened the courts to a flood of "highly subjective
definitional problems." 99
Even though the dissent did not find Enmund's death sentence unconstitutionally excessive, it would nevertheless vacate the death sentence
and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. 100 Declaring that
the eighth amendment requires consideration of the defendant's particular circumstances in imposing the death penalty,O' the dissent found
error in the trial court's failure to consider Enmund's minor participation as a mitigating circumstance. 102
97. 102 S. Ct. at 3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The second aspect of
excessiveness, whether the punishment involves the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain, was addressed by the dissent only in a footnote. Id. at
3392 n.42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent declared that the Court
could only speculate on the deterrent effect of the death penalty on other
felony murderers and that the effectiveness of the death penalty in furthering
the purpose of retribution was best left to legislative resolution. Id.
98. Id. at 3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
[T]he Court fails to explain why the Eighth Amendment concept of
proportionality requires rejection of standards of blameworthiness
based on other levels of intent, such as, for example, the intent to
commit an armed robbery coupled with the knowledge that armed
robberies involve substantial risk of death or serious injury to other
persons.
Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that as to the above example posited
by Justice O'Connor, the plurality observed that it would be a "very different" case and rejected the notion that death frequently occurred in the
commission of armed robberies. See id. at 3378. See also note 80 supra.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 3391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated
that "[t]he Court's holding today is especially disturbing because it makes
intent a matter of federal constitutional law, requiring this Court both to
review highly subjective definitional problems customarily left to state criminal
law and to develop an Eighth Amendment meaning of intent." Id. Justice
O'Connor further stated that "while the type of mens rea of the defendant
must be considered carefully in assessing the proper penalty, it is not so
critical a factor in determining blameworthiness as to require a finding of
intent to kill in order to impose the death penalty for felony murder." Id.
100. Id. at 3394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 3392 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor stated, "Repeatedly, this Court has emphasized that capital sentencing decisions must focus 'on the circumstances of each individual homicide
and individual defendant.'" Id. (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at
258). For a discussion of Proffitt, see note 32 supra,
102. 102 S. Ct. at 3394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent found
that the trial court's erroneous conclusion that Enmund had personally shot
the Kerseys effectively prevented the court from considering Enmund's relatively minor role in the killings as a mitigating circumstance. Id. For a
discussion of the trial court's findings of fact, see note 9 supra. For a discussion of the Florida Supreme Court's review of the trial court's findings, see
note 12 supra. The dissent found the failure, in imposing the death penalty,
to consider the particular circumstances of the offense unconstitutional in
light of the Court's previous decisions. 102 S.Ct. at 3392-94 (O'Connor, J.,
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In analyzing the decision in Enmund v. Florida,0 3 it appears that
the plurality's two-pronged excessiveness inquiry into disproportionality
and the purposeless imposition of pain is wholly consistent with the
Court's analysis in other recent decisions involving the death penalty. 1 4
The examination of objective factors such as legislative judgments and
jury determinations as to the appropriateness of punishment, as well as
a subjective analysis of proportionality by the Court itself is consistent
with the Court's approach in both Gregg and Coker.'0 It is noteworthy,
however, that Enmund represents the first instance in which the Court
has used the alternate aspect of eighth amendment excessiveness-the
purposeless imposition of pain-in striking down the imposition of a
06
death sentence.'
Concerning the plurality's examination of objective factors, it is
submitted that although the plurality's findings on legislative judgment
were not overwhelming, the findings did sufficiently demonstrate that
the prevailing societal view is that the death penalty is inappropriate
for one who neither kills, attempts or intends to kill, nor contemplates
a killing. 107 The dissent's analysis on this point seems misleading in
dissenting) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). For a discussion of the cited cases,
see note 32 supra.
103. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
104. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976). For a discussion of Coker, see notes 53-60 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of Gregg, see notes 46-52 and accompanying text
supra.

105. For a discussion of Gregg and Coker, see notes 46-60 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the plurality's examination of objective
factors and the plurality's subjective analysis of proportionality, see notes
63-70 and accompanying text supra. The Enmund plurality failed to address
the factor of historical precedent even though the plurality specifically recognized it as an objective
factor in determining disproportionality. 102 S.
Ct. at 8372. It is submitted that this omission is not fatal to the plurality's

reasoning. The eighth amendment must be applied in light of the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Court did evaluate legislative judgments
and jury decisions in an attempt to ascertain the predominant contemporary
view on the proportionality of Enmund's punishment to his offense. Id. at
3372-76. It is submitted that an examination of historical precedent would
contribute little in determining contemporary standards of decency. For a
discussion of Trop, see notes 45 & 50 supra.
106. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court employed both aspects of' eighth
amendment excessiveness in upholding a death penalty. For a discussion of
Gregg, see notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra. In Coker v. Georgia,
the Court used only a disproportionality analysis in striking down a death
sentence. For a discussion of Coker, see notes 53-60 and accompanying text
supra.
107. It is submitted that the fact that almost two-thirds of the states did
not authorize the death penalty for Enmund's offense created a strong presumption that the death penalty is inappropriate in such a case. It is also
noteworthy that half of the states that authorized the death penalty in such a
case required aggravating circumstances above and beyond the mere partici-
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that it focuses solely on whether the death penalty was authorized for a
felony murderer who neither killed nor intended to kill and totally disregards any other statutory requirements for the imposition of the death
penalty. 0 8 Although the statistical data relied upon by the plurality
in its analysis of jury decisions is subject to some criticism, 109 it is asserted that the questionable nature of that data is not so serious as to
leave any doubt on the rarity of a death sentence in a case such as
Enmund's.110
It is therefore submitted that the plurality justifiably found the
penalty of death a disproportionate punishment for one who neither
took life, attempted or intended to take life, nor contemplated that a
life would be taken."' Moreover, even if the penalty was not disproportionate, the plurality's alternate holding that the death penalty was
futile in advancing the purposes of deterrence and retribution in
Enmund's circumstances should independently preclude the death sen112
tence in such cases with no further question.
pation in a robbery in which an accomplice takes life. For a discussion of
the plurality's analysis of legislative judgments, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.

108. It is submitted that the dissent erred in conducting its examination
of legislative judgments as embodied in death penalty statutes by not considering the particular circumstances of Enmund's case. Enmund's death
sentence was imposed not only in the absence of evidence that he killed or
intended to kill but also in the absence of evidence that he even contemplated
a killing. 102 S. Ct. at 3372. The dissent also failed to consider the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors of the various sentencing schemes.
Id. at 3374 n.15. For a discussion of the dissent's analysis of legislative
judgments, see note 94 and accompanying text supra.
109. For a discussion of the dissent's criticism of the jury decision data
relied on by the plurality, see notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
110. It is submitted that even though the jury sentencing statistics relied
on by the plurality did not reveal the percentage of cases where juries refrained from imposing the death penalty on a vicarious felony murderer, the
statistics did in fact indicate that very few defendants in this category have
actually received a sentence of death. In the absence of statistics of a more
enlightening nature, and in consideration of the extreme gravity of the death
penalty, it is submitted that the plurality properly took a conservative approach and properly concluded that juries find the death penalty inappropriate for offenders such as Enmund. For a discussion of the plurality's analysis
of jury, sentencing decisions, see notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
111. For a discussion of the plurality's findings of disproportionality, see
notes 62-76 and accompanying text supra.
112. For a discussion of the plurality's analysis of the purposes of deterrence and retribution, see notes 77-81 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of the dissent's evaluation of these two purposes, see note 97 supra.
As to the dissent's charge that the Court could only speculate on the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent, it is submitted that the plurality's
reliance on competent robbery statistics limited the degree of speculation
which actually occurred. Although the dissent declared that the value of the
death penalty in serving the purpose of retribution is best left to legislative
resolution, it is submitted that the Court, as constitutional arbiter, bears the
ultimate duty in determining the constitutionality of the death penalty in any
given case. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 597.
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As to the dissent's accusation that the plurality in Enmund made
intent a matter of constitutional law, 113 it is submitted that the dissenters
read the plurality's holding too broadly. 1" 4 The Enmund plurality carefully tailored its holding to the imposition of the death penalty when
the defendant neither caused, attempted, intended, nor contemplated a
killing."15 Therefore it can only be said that the plurality found the
death penalty to be unconstitutional when imposed on a defendant who
was not present at the scene of a killing and who lacked an active
culpable mental state with respect to the killing. With the mens rea
issue turning on the absence or presence of culpable mental state rather
than degree of culpable mental state, it is submitted that the "highly
subjective definitional problems" which the Court is likely to encounter
may be somewhat less serious than the dissenters might have imagined."16
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that in future cases the issue of whether
the death penalty may be imposed for states of mind less culpable than
intent to kill may arise. This issue was not before the Court in Enmund
and consequently must await future decision.
In considering the impact of the Enmund decision, it is suggested
that its ramifications may reach well beyond the eighteen jurisdictions
currently authorizing the death penalty for a vicarious felony murderer
who lacks a culpable mental state. 117 Although Enmund does not
appear to prevent the death penalty for felony murder in all instances,
it is suggested that the decision could prompt the abrogation of at least
113. For a discussion of this accusation, see note 99 and accompanying
text supra.
114. For a discussion of the dissent's framing of the issue before the
Court, see note 93 supra.
115. See 102 S. Ct. at 3372, 3379. Referring to Florida's vicarious felony
murder law, the plurality stated,
It was thus irrelevant to Enmund's challenge to the death sentence
that he did not himself kill and was not present at the killings; also
beside the point was whether he intended that the Kerseys be killed
or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used if necessary to
effectuate the robbery or a safe escape. We have concluded that imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances is inconsistent
with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 3372. At the conclusion of its opinion, the plurality narrowly stated
its holding:
Because the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty in this
case in the absence of proof that Enmund killed or attempted to kill,
and regardless of whether Enmund intended or contemplated that life
would be taken, we reverse the judgment upholding the death penalty
and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Id. at 3379. It is submitted that the plurality carefully avoided basing its
holding merely on the fact that Enmund neither intended nor caused the
killings. The plurality emphasized that Enmund might not have even contemplated the possibility of a killing.
116. For a discussion of the dissent's concern over the definitional problems of "intent", see note 99 and accompanying text supra.
117. For a list of these states, see notes 65-66 supra.
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vicarious felony murder as a capital offense in many jurisdictions.
Moreover, in reaffirming the two-pronged approach to excessiveness
articulated in Gregg 118 and relied on in Coker 119 to invalidate the death
penalty for the offense of rape, the Court in Enmund may be indicating
the beginning of a new series of bouts between the eighth amendment
and the death penalty, this time on the dual grounds of disproportionality and the failure to fulfill the purposes of punishment. 20 It is conceivable that excessiveness challenges will be made to the imposition of
the death penalty not only for various types of murder but also for
offenses not involving the taking of a life such as aircraft hijacking and
kidnapping. 121 Although the outcome of such challenges cannot be
predicted, any increased scrutiny of the death penalty, the ultimate
punishment, could only be applauded.
Charles H. Pangburn III
118. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a discussion of Gregg,
see notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
119. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). For a discussion of Coker,
see notes 53-60 and accompanying text supra.
120. As previously indicated, a recent line of eighth amendment cases
challenged the death penalty on the inadequacies of various sentencing procedures. For a discussion of Furman v. Georgia and other cases on that issue,
see notes 21-32 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that there now
may be a series of eighth amendment challenges to the death penalty based
on the concept of excessiveness.
121. As of the beginning of 1981, Georgia, Idaho, and Mississippi authorized the death penalty for aircraft hijacking or piracy, and the federal
government authorized the death penalty for aircraft piracy resulting in
death. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 15, at
33-34. Colorado authorized the death penalty for kidnapping. while Louisiana and Montana authorized the death sentence for kidnapping when the
victim is killed. See id. at 33. It is also interesting to note that Colorado
authorized the death penalty for certain drug offenses. See id. For a survey
of state and federal capital laws, see id. at 33-38.
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